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Abstract It becomes possible to take advantage of
seamless biometric authentication on mobile devices due to
increasing quality and quantity of built-in sensors,
increasing processing power of the devices, and wireless
connectivity. However, practical effectiveness of the bio-
metric authentication application depends on user’s envi-
ronment conditions that can decrease the accuracy of
biometrics recognition or make the acquisition process
undesirable for mobile user in a given moment, i.e.,
effectiveness depends on usage context. In this paper,
context-based biometric authentication model for mobile
devices is proposed. It enables determining the most
accurate authentication method at the moment along with
the most accurate form of interacting with a user w.r.t.
authentication process. The generic model designed and
verified with proof-of-concept implementation constitutes a
foundation for building further adaptable and extensible
multi-factor context-dependent systems for mobile
authentication.
Keywords Adaptable authentication  Adaptable access
control  Biometric authentication  Context-based
authentication  Mobile authentication  Mobile devices
1 Introduction and motivation
Nowadays, the mobile revolution is observed. Mobile
services generate growing data transfer with thousands, if
not millions, of mobile applications. They are usually
based on BYOD (bring your own device) model which
makes secure means of mobile user authentication a
necessity. It concerns authentication of users on their
mobile devices (e.g., unlocking a device), authentication of
mobile users in remote services (e.g., to authorize trans-
actions), and authentication of digital documents (e.g.,
verifying signature of a message sent to a mobile device).
Means of user authentication used so far, such as pass-
words, PINs, or graphic patterns, are an inadequate choice
for the new mobile world for a number of reasons. They are
relatively easy to eavesdrop in untrusted environments
(e.g., industrial cameras can record mobile users almost
everywhere). They are also either uncomfortable for users
to input on mobile device due to complexity, or trivial for
brute force attacks (in case of short passwords) and for
other attacks (graphic patterns for touchscreens). What is
even worse, users tend to disable authentication at all, if
they are forced to input cryptographically strong passwords
with small mobile virtual keyboard [7]. Almost one out of
three users does not protect his or her mobile device with a
password, and 69 % of Europe citizens have stored or
accessed confidential data using mobile devices in 2012
[27]. This is all the more true in case of strong two-factor
authentication (combination with one-time passwords or
peripheral devices), which is time-consuming, and there-
fore frequently switched off by the users.
Fortunately, in this area, biometrical authentication
techniques seem to be promising for mobile users. They
eliminate the problem of memorizing and typing in a
number of complicated passwords, and the problem of
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carrying and using other identifiers (e.g., credit cards).
When properly implemented, authentication with biomet-
rics is natural, seamless, fast, and secure even within
untrusted environments. Uniqueness of biometrical fea-
tures minimizes error rate, and using biometrics combined
with other access control means reduces the risk of a
successful intrusion. It is worth noting that many of bio-
metric authentication schemes can be easily implemented
on mobile devices taking advantage of already existing
built-in device sensors such as cameras or microphones, or,
as in the case of latest iPhone 6s or Samsung Galaxy S5,
built-in fingerprint sensor. Biometrics has appeared on the
ground of mass consumer electronics, and it is based on
sensors that are cheap and reliable enough. New applica-
tions allowing mobile user to be biometrically authenti-
cated not only on her device but also in a remote service or
store can be perceived as a trigger for a new m-commerce
trend.
The need for seamless service usage even in diversified
external conditions is the reason why users switch to
mobile devices and applications. Context-based approaches
applied to the mobile applications are the attempt to
address this challenge. They receive and interpret infor-
mation regarding current environment conditions that
compose the context at the given moment in order to make
usage of mobile applications more efficient. Users do not
have to manually switch between options and preferences,
since mobile device automatically specifies both the con-
tent to be presented and the form of the presentation.
Support for the context dependency seems to be one of the
ultimate goals of the ICT for e-society—providing highest
possible process automation and intelligence that is able to
semantically interpret information coming from external
sources.
The approach presented in this article is based on two
main groups of techniques mentioned above, i.e., biomet-
rics and context dependency. Having access to several
authentication methods, including non-biometric and bio-
metric ones, the mobile device can be equipped with an
application adapting itself to constantly changing external
conditions. The simplest example scenario would be riding
the bicycle or driving a car that makes it hard to authen-
ticate in the device with the regular passwords that absorbs
one’s attention. The proposed context-based solution can
check whether there are such factors at the given moment
and, if so, can propose the most accurate authentication
method along with the most accurate form of informing the
user about the chosen method. The factors that have to be
taken into account can be grouped into two categories: the
presence of the conditions that decrease the quality of the
given biometric signal (e.g., too high noise level for the
voice biometrics), or the presence of the conditions that
make given biometrics undesirable for user at the moment
(e.g., need for discreet device usage during the business
meeting, which also eliminates the voice biometrics). The
goal of the proposed approach is to design context-based
biometric authentication solution assuming that it has to be
as easy to implement as possible, take advantage of pre-
existing mobile sensors, and be dynamically adaptable to
current user profile. The work also concerns identification
of the critical points of the system and the future devel-
opment perspectives.
The initial section of the article contains description of
biometric authentication methods and biometric data pro-
cessing, including context-based authentication, as well as
an analysis of the existing works. In the subsequent three
sections of the article, the proposed model is elaborated in
detail, discussed, and the whole work is concluded.
2 Related work
2.1 Biometric authentication
Biometric authentication (referred to as biometrics) con-
sists of three steps: acquisition of biometric data with the
sensor, converting the data to digital template, and com-
parison of the template to a reference template. This pro-
cess can be used for user identification (one-to-many
model, e.g., to identify mobile user for a remote service) as
well as for user verification (one-to-one model, e.g., to
verify whether it is the owner who tries to unlock the
device).
Biometric data represent biometric features of the
human body, which is ‘‘something you are’’ authentication
factor, contrary to ‘‘something you know’’ (e.g., password),
‘‘something you have’’ (e.g., token), or ‘‘where you are’’
(specific mobile systems). Biometric features can be divi-
ded into two main groups: physiological (e.g., fingerprints,
face features, DNA) and behavioral (e.g., typing charac-
teristics, voice, gait). Biometric features have the proper-
ties of universality, individuality, permanence,
collectability, and performance.
However, it has to be stressed that there is no ‘‘ideal
biometrics.’’ Application of the given biometry is always a
trade-off between security, comfort, invasiveness, and cost
[17]. Similar constatation can be made regarding algo-
rithms comparing biometrical sample with the reference
template. While password or access card verification works
according to Boolean logic, in case of biometry the process
is more complex since it is impossible to acquire two
identical biometric samples, among others due to envi-
ronment conditions (or context). False acceptance and false
reject errors occur, and corresponding measures are used
[29], namely FAR (false acceptance rate) and FRR (false
reject rate). CER (crossover error rate) is an error rate (and
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sensor sensitivity setting) where FAR and FRR are equal.
In the following subsections, biometrics that are or
potentially can be used in the mobile devices have been
described.
Fingerprints Factors affecting quality of fingerprints
acquisition include dirt, humidity, skin tensility, pattern
location, and orientation. The following acquisition tech-
nologies are used (usually in non-mobile devices): optical
sensors, which are cheap but easy to circumvent and dirt
sensitive; capacitive sensors, dirt and humidity sensitive;
thermal sensors, temperature sensitive; and ultrasonic sen-
sors, expensive but hard to circumvent, since they analyze
not only fingerprints but also finger physical properties, such
as blood vessels. The example of off-the-shelf fingerprint
solutions designed for mobile devices is Tactivo by Precise
Biometrics [22]. The biometrical patterns are stored either on
a device or in a smart card (the card itself can be used as an
additional authentication factor). Another example of simi-
lar solution is iFMID by S.I.C. Biometrics [25], where three
options for pattern storage are available: on device, on cor-
porate servers, or service provider servers. Both solutions
support CAC (common access card) and PIV (personal
identity verification) standards.
Face Face biometrics usage is unobtrusive for users due
to noninvasiveness and ease to collect the data with a
regular camera. Algorithms processing face images can
compare either face geometry (geometrical relations
between selected details) or vectors describing whole face
images. Nowadays, researches on face 3D models are
conducted. Such approaches allow for face recognition
from different angles and make successful attack much
more difficult [1]. Lighting, camera position, glasses,
clothes, aging, and other face changes are the factors that
impact the quality of face recognition. FastAccess Any-
where is a face recognition application designed for iOS,
Android, and Windows OSs [24]. It secures both access to
a device and to Web sites and applications. Second
authentication factor can be employed optionally. The
application can distinguish between a face and a face
image. Additionally, multiple devices can be synchronized
and used after single authentication. For iOS, FaceVault
[21] has been designed which, according to the producer,
offers face recognition regardless of glasses or makeup
change. Recognition is performed on the server side.
Voice Voice recognition, as in the case of face, is a
method that is easy to apply in mobile devices, since
software only is required. Authentication can be performed
according to one of four schemes, where user has to ver-
balize fixed phrase, phrase send by the system (each time
new), freely chosen phrase, or a conversation which veri-
fies both knowledge and voice characteristics. Factors that
affect quality of the voice recognition include background
noise, human emotional state, aging, or respiratory dis-
eases. An example of a solution that adapts the preexisting
corporate access control to the voice authentication
(maintaining password-based authentication if desired) is
Mobile VocalPassword by Nuance [20].
Iris Iris image can be acquired with regular camera or near-
infrared scan. In the latter case, influence of the external
factors, causing, e.g., light reflexes, can be reduced. The
structure of the iris is analyzed, not the color (although the
color can be an additional aspect). Taking advantage of the
fact that eye pupil constantly adapts to changing light con-
ditions, advanced iris-based techniques can distinguish real
eye from the its static image used by an attacker.
Finger veins Finger/palm veins recognition is one of the
most accurate biometric authentication methods. The
examples include touchless Fujitsu system, PalmSecure
[10], or Hitachi, VeinID [15]. Vascular technology is
considered the least privacy intrusive, since it is hard to
collect samples without ones acceptance. Also data
acquisition speed, recognition reliability, pattern persis-
tence during lifetime, and high security (it is impossible to
use even cut off finger to break access control) are the
advantages of the technology. The accuracy of the scanning
process can be decreased by light sources, specific kind of
dirt, and finger position [28].
Facial thermography Face thermogram is, contrary to
regular face image, resistant to variable lighting conditions
or other face image changes [5]. However, specific camera
has to be used, having thermal imaging sensor. Other dif-
ficulties related to recognition process include variable
nose and mouth temperatures caused by respiration, or
glasses blocking thermal imaging. Also thermal face image
is dependent on intensive physical activity, or eating [4].
Electrical properties of human body Touchscreen rec-
ognizing user based on his or her electrical properties has
been constructed [13]. The method needs subsequent work
that would reduce the impact of the environment on the
collected data; therefore, nowadays it could be applied as a
supporting biometric factor only.
Touchscreen gestures Users can be identified based on the
way how they use touchscreen. In the research experiments
[9], touchscreen gestures profile were defined based on 53
distinct features (e.g., position of the trace, movement
direction and speed, pressure, distance between points).
2.2 Combining biometrics
If authentication with a single biometrics is not secure
enough for the given application, it can be combined with
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second authentication factor (biometric or other group, i.e.,
possession, knowledge, location). Biometrics combinations
are performed according to 6 different models [5]:
• different biometrics,
• multiple use of one biometrics (e.g., acquisition of the
data from many fingers, or from the second eye),
• multiple sampling of one biometrics,
• multiple sampling with different sensors,
• multiple comparators,
• multi-factor authentication.
Loose coupling and tight coupling of different biomet-
rics can be distinguished [5]. In loose-coupled approach, a
process of comparing of biometric sample with template is
performed for different biometrics separately. Final
authentication decision is a conjunction/disjunction of
independent subdecisions. In turn, in tight-coupled
approach biometric samples are set together in a common
vector, which is a base for the final decision.
A protocol for the factors acquisition is not always
static, since it can be based on dynamic requests generated
exclusively for a given user. An example of such approach
is authentication based on voice responses, which is a
combination of biometric feature and a confidential
knowledge factor. As the number of responses increases,
the analyzed sample gets larger; thus, the probability of
right authentication decision increases.
2.3 Continuous authentication
In the standard access control models, authentication is
performed once, in the logging phase. Since in the mobile
scenarios devices are not physically separated from the
intruders, standard models can be insufficient for the
effective security. Applying biometrics for mobile access
control allows for continuous authentication during the
session, without additional interactions with a user. Fre-
quently repetitive face or iris verifications [26], electro-
cardiogram monitoring, or behavioral biometrics can be a
base of continuous verification. In this context, the set of all
biometrics containing only ‘‘hard’’ factors is extended to
include also ‘‘soft’’ factors (e.g., color of clothing). They
have high error rate, but are useful in continuous authen-
tication schemes. In the mobile scenarios, low FRR is
significant for the unobtrusiveness of the process [19].
Even if at the same time FAR is higher, it is neutralized by
the fact of frequent verifications.
An example of commercially available mobile device
with continuous authentication is Nymi by Bionym [11]. It
employs an electronic bracelet connected wirelessly to the
mobile device, collecting continuously user’s electrocar-
diogram data used for authentication. Authentication takes
into account current bracelet–device distance.
Additionally, it allows for defining gesture-based custom
interactions using bracelet built-in gyroscope and
accelerometer. Another example, resulting from research
community efforts, encompasses continuous authentication
in medical system environment [2]. Hospital workstations
have been integrated through servers with portable staff’s
smart cards. Card holders moving away from workstations
are instantly logged out.
2.4 Context-based biometric authentication
on mobile devices
A number of research works on biometric authentication on
mobile devices exist, e.g., [3, 31]; however, only few of
them tackle the issues of context sensitivity and adaptation.
In the existing articles that focus on context-based methods
for mobile devices, authors divide sensors that are data
sources for the context into the classes of physical (related
to device location and environment) and logical (describing
device’s state), as well as into the classes of active (acti-
vated sensor sends data) and passive (requiring user actions
to send data) [30]. Also biometric authentication itself can
be either passive (working in the background) or active
(requiring user actions to authenticate). Therefore, the
context notion and its practical usage with biometry is
considered in various ways.
In some approaches, context is used to improve effi-
ciency of systems that are composed of not only one
handheld device, but many diverse and interoperable
devices (cf. the idea of Internet of Things). For example, in
[12, 16] a healthcare supporting system decides which
sensor/device is chosen to collect data and considers sensor
limitations (e.g., lack of Internet connection). However, in
these works the factors that impact the user authentication
are predefined, and the process of choosing authentication
method does not depend on environmental conditions; just
the continuous multi-factor authentication is applied. The
authors only suggest that context could impact the quality
of stored and acquired credential patterns matching.
In other approaches, the relation between environment
conditions and authentication method to be applied is
defined in a different way, i.e., context itself is treated as a
passive authentication factor. At the same time, context can
be used to determine a security level which indicates the
strength of an active factor required to successfully log in
or unlock the device. Such approach, presented in [14], is
focused on combining a passive factor (or a set of passive
factors) with a dynamically chosen active factor. The
selection of the latter depends on security level. If the
context pattern indicates the security level is high, a
‘‘weaker’’ method is selected as the second factor. In this
work, biometric active factors have not been used (just PIN
and passwords). Other limitation of this work concerns the
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fact that its validation has been performed on a simple
model assuming user location as a single passive authen-
tication factor. An approach based on similar assumptions
has been presented in [23]. The research is focused on
dynamic selection of authentication time and applications
for which authentication is required. The active authenti-
cation method is PIN only. As for biometric features, they
are treated as a passive factor, and only voice is collected
using the mobile device sensor (face signal is used as well,
but using stationary camera).
Also self-adapting approaches have been proposed. For
instance, in [30] a classifier has been taught to detect sets of
conditions reflecting typical usage schemes of eligible users.
Within this work, context data are used to form a behavioral
pattern perceived as biometric features, and as such, they
support the authentication process. Emphasis is put on the
authentication based on context data only, which is a con-
troversial approach since attack schemes based on ‘‘soft’’
behavioral biometry can be easily conducted. Similarly in
[18] continuous authentication model measuring confidence
based on comprehensive user behavior sets has been pro-
posed, taking into account also disabilities specificity.
It can be noted that in some research similar input as in
the above-mentioned papers is used to solve different
problems. For example, in [6] the authors combine context
and biometric data, not to choose optimal method nor to
authenticate user passively on mobile device. Instead, their
goal is to process biometric sample using the context data
to produce cryptographic contextual pseudo-identities that
facilitate authentication in ubiquitous services.
In any of these works, the problem of context impact on
the quality of the biometric samples (for various biometric
features) acquired under changing environmental condi-
tions in the process of active authentication is not addres-
sed. Also the possibility of determining, based on the
context data, user’s intended interaction scheme during
authentication is not explored. Moreover, in context-based
biometric authentication systems, after one biometric
method is chosen, a user has to be informed (and react
accordingly) about the choice with appropriate modality,
that also has to be chosen taking into account the current
context limitations. Existing models do not adapt user
interactions process related to the authentication to the
limitations of the context.
3 Model for context-based biometric
authentication for mobile devices
3.1 Assumptions
The goal of this work is to propose a system for mobile
devices that, based on context data (e.g., location, noise,
usage mode), chooses the optimal biometrics for authen-
tication along with optimal communication method to
inform the user about the choice and interact with him.
Sample context-dependent factors that impact the biomet-
rics are depicted in Fig. 1.
The proposed system can be applied in the following
usage scenarios:
• mobile device unlocking;
• authentication in remote services or mobile applications
assuming one-factor authentication;
• choosing biometric method that is the second one in
two-factor authentication (e.g., in financial transaction
authentication/authorization schemes).
The system can be extended in order to:
• support choosing more than one biometry;
• support choosing non-biometric authentication
methods.
Sensors in mobile devices When designing context-based
solution, one has to start with identification of accessible
types of information that can be acquired to build a context.
Not all built-in sensors provide data that can be interpreted to
form a useful knowledge about the context. The most popular
mobile sensors set with the results of usefulness analysis for
biometrical authentication is presented in Table 1.
Finally, for the purpose of the proposed model it has
been assumed that devices are equipped with the following






Fig. 1 Example of the factors impacting effectiveness of biometry
usage
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Authentication and interaction methods In Sect. 2, bio-
metrical authentication methods that either are used or are
subject of research have been described. The most robust
ones include fingerprints, face, and voice recognition.
These three authentication methods are applied to the
proposed model. Regarding methods of user interaction for
the optimal way of informing a user about the chosen
authentication, also three methods are applied: screen
interaction (text message, touch reaction), voice interaction
(voice sentences or signals and voice reaction), vibration
interaction (different kinds of vibrations and shaking
reaction).
Sensor data discretization Each result of sensor measure-
ment is discretized before it is passed to the decision process.
For example, temperature scale is divided into two ranges
(less than and more than 0 C), based on a priori knowledge
regarding device usability and user limitation (gloves) in the
subzero temperatures. However, the initial discretization
ranges are only the starting point for the self-adapting process,
which will be elaborated in the further sections.
Authentication and presentation constraints Predefined
constraints constitute a starting point for the self-adapting
process. They are based on:
• The knowledge regarding efficiency of the given
biometrics w.r.t. the set of external conditions, e.g.,
high FRR in case of low-light conditions for face
recognition.
• The knowledge regarding typical user behavior and his
or her limitation in certain situations, e.g., smartphone
muting is interpreted as silent usage user intention and
therefore voice authentication is excluded.
Constraints resulting from typical user behaviors can be
replaced with constraints resulting from initial learning
phase. In such case, when biometric authentication is
needed, all the biometric methods are activated, and the
fact that one of them is used is recorded as the choice for
the given set of environment conditions. The constraints
are adjusted iteratively, as it is described in the further
sections. The learning can be performed locally in the
device, or remotely in the service collecting the usage data
from a number of devices.
3.2 Decision process
Defining a user situation based on criteria values Ac-
cording to the criteria listed in Table 2, every usage situ-
ation is represented by a vector of criteria values. Each
criterion value is an integer from 1 to t (where t 2).
Examples of vectors have been presented in Table 3. They
reflect the following situations:
1. A user walks in a street in the summer. Speed is low,
lighting is good, noise level is low. The user has not
muted her phone.
2. A user drives a car late night in the winter. Speaker-
phone is plugged in.
3. A user walks through the passenger coach in the train.
4. A device is lying on the table, and a user interacts with
it with her gestures.
Table 1 Usefulness of the mobile device sensor’s data for biometrical authentication
Sensor Data type Usefulness
Camera Images Useful. Image processing can be used to low-/high-lighting
assessment
Microphone Sound Useful. Sound signal analysis can be used to noise level and
noise type assessment
Accelerometer/gyroscope Linear acceleration/angular position Useful. To identify type of shakes or user movement
Barometer Pressure/altitude Low usefulness
Hygrometer Humidity Low usefulness
Thermometer Temperature Useful
GPS module Location, movement speed Useful
Gesture sensor Information about using the gestures for touchless
interactions
Useful
Magnetometer Direction and magnitude of magnetic field (works as
a compass)
Not useful
Proximity sensor Centimeters or Boolean values (depending on the
sensor, e.g., Apple’s use NEAR/FAR)
Useful as a supporting sensor. Usually range is limited to up
to 5 cm
Hall sensor Magnetic field magnitude Can be useful to check whether device is inserted in a case
(e.g., to wake up device automatically)
Light sensor (RGB) Intensity of RGB colors Useful, but camera can be used as well
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Table 2 Criteria used in the model
Criterion Description Values Example of how criterion value impacts the
context
1. Sound User profile settings: sound on or off 1—sound is off Sound disabled implies silence requirement; voice
authentication is avoided2—sound is on
2. Vibrations User profile settings: vibrations on or off 1—vibrations are
off
Vibrations disabled implies they are not used to





Type of shakes registered by the device. Based on
shakes characteristics, it is possible to determine
whether a user is walking or not
1—walking Shakes typical for walking in conjunction with










Movement speed registered based on GPS module
data
1—0 km/h; Vehicle speed in conjunction with speakerphone















Too high light intensity decreases display
visibility. Information regarding the chosen






6. Noise level Noise level (measured in dB). Noise level right
before authentication impacts SNR
1—
acceptable level






Dominating type of noise. It is an element
building the usage context. Also it influences the
algorithm choice. The effectiveness of the
recognition depends on type of noise
1—voices, talks If human voice noise is present and, at the same
time, voice is not preferred in the ranking, voice




8. Temperature Temperature measured by the mobile device.
Alternatively, temperature value can be received
from the weather forecast service (less accurate
because of lack on indoor/outdoor location
information)
1—\0 C Temperature\0 C increases probability that user
has limited ability to use fingerprint
authentication
2—C0 C










Peripheral devices in use, or built-in speakerphone
in use
1—no peripherals Speakerphone connected or turned on excludes
authentication with fingerprints2—speakerphone
3—headphones
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5. A user moves in a hurry. It is winter,
acceptable lighting.
According to the proposed approach, a user has to define
a complete ranking of the preferences regarding authenti-
cation and presentation methods. Therefore, taking into
account vector values and user preferences, the system
always has enough information to:
• Interpret context data with respect to user preferences.
Some criteria values combinations are significant only
in conjunction with specific preference combinations.
• Make final choice—if there are more than one authen-
tication/presentation methods allowed after the first
phase of the decision process.
Sample representation of authentication/communication
preference rankings is illustrated in Table 4. Both rankings
have to be complete.
Total number of theoretically possible situations within






 p1!  p2! ð1Þ
where k is criteria number, xk number of values for crite-
rion k, p1 number of authentication methods, and p2
number of communication methods.
Excluding criteria that cannot be used Next step is
specifying which criteria cannot be used in a given situa-
tion. Majority of constraints are complex, i.e., caused by
coexistence of several criteria values at the same time.
There are also few simple constraints related to existence
of one criteria value.
Criteria and preferences constraints In the proposed
model, the subsequent phase is called Criteria and pref-
erences constraints (Fig. 2). This phase is required since
for some criteria combinations it has to be taken into
account on which absolute (e.g., fingerprints ranked third)
or relative (e.g., face recognition before voice recognition)
position an authentication method is situated. Criteria and
preferences constrains are predefined or defined during an
initial learning phase. For example, for the lighting crite-
rion the minimal value 1 means insufficient lighting and
maximal value 6 means excessive lighting making screen
usage arduous. Value 3 reflects lighting which is sufficient
but slightly decreasing recognition efficiency (measured
with CER). Therefore, constraint rules can be defined such
as if value 3 on the lighting criterion appears and, at the
same time, face recognition is ranked 2 or 3, then face
recognition is excluded from the authentication.
Final authentication method choice The choice of one
biometrical authentication method is held through:
• elimination—finally a method that has not been
excluded is chosen;
• preferences analysis—applied if after elimination there
is more than one method chosen or none of them is
chosen.
In the proposed approach, each time when authentication
method in chosen by the system, the user can override the
choice manually. In such case, his or her decision is reg-
istered along with complete situation vector and later used
as a part of a learning set.
3.3 Learning phase
Initial learning phase In the initial learning phase, when
the mobile device user has to be authenticated, all bio-
metrical sensors are activated. The user is authenticated
with the method that is used successfully as the first one,
e.g., putting his/her finger on a fingerprint scanner is
equivalent to choosing the fingerprint biometrics. After a
learning set is gathered, constraint rules are induced. To
shorten the time of the learning phase, subsets of the rules
are predefined.
Table 3 Examples of situations—vectors of criteria values












1. 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
2. 2 2 2 4 2 1 4 2 2 2
3. 2 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 2 1
4. 2 2 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1
5. 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 1
Table 4 Sample authentication and communication preference
rankings
Rank Authentication method Rank Communication method
1. Face recognition 1. Screen communication
2. Fingerprints 2. Vibrations
3. Voice recognition 3. Voice message
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Changing context criteria classes In the first phase,
sensor data are discretized into integer values correspond-
ing to distinct situations. In the learning phase, as the
learning progresses, initial discretization can be modified
by:
• Adding/removing classes.
For example, initially, lighting values are discretized
into 3 classes: 1—‘‘too dark,’’ 2—‘‘optimal,’’ 3—‘‘too
bright.’’ During the learning phase, this discretization
can be modified into, e.g., 1—‘‘too dark,’’ 2—‘‘in-
door,’’ 3—‘‘outdoor,’’ 4—‘‘too bright.’’
• Moving the borders of the existing classes.
For example, during the learning phase it turns out that
in the temperature 5 C a user still does not use
fingerprint authentication (because of gloves). Then,
the value of the border between classes 1 and 2 is
increased.
Constraint rules modification Constraint rules set is
improved by:
• Rule removal.
For example, assume that the user has overridden the
chosen biometrics with face recognition several times
(that has been earlier excluded by constraint rules). The
constraint rules can overlap each other, that is several
constraint rules can exclude common biometric method
at the same time. For example, overridden choices
in situations s1, s2, s3 have been made because of the
constraints s1 ¼ fc1; c2; c3g, s2 ¼ fc2; c3g,
s3 ¼ fc1; c2g. Therefore, the constraint c2 will be
removed.
• Rules adding suggestion.
Rules adding suggestion is performed when more than
one authentication method is allowed after applying the
constraint rules, and the subsequent system’s choice is
based on user’s preferences, but the user has overridden
the choice. It means that initially too many methods
have been accepted.
Indoor/outdoor classification The efficiency of using the
criteria for proper context description depends strongly on
the fact whether user position is outdoor or indoor (inside a
building or a vehicle). For example, taking into account the
time of the day and the season does impact the context only
if the user is in an outdoor location, where the influence of
the weather, lighting, transport, and noise can be signifi-
cant. Indoor/outdoor distinction is usually not possible,
even based on digital maps containing the building place-
ment data. However, the system can be taught how to
determine the indoor/outdoor value based on combinations
of different criteria.
Fig. 2 Decision process in the
context-based biometric
authentication
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• Verification with Web service. Comparing the sensor-
collected temperature to a value of a weather parameter
provided by a Web service. If the difference is
significant, the indoor/outdoor value can be set ad
hoc. In cases when the values are similar, indoor/
outdoor value can be still determined using earlier
measurements that are geotagged.
• Noise amplitude. Works in some large cities.
• Noise type. Indoor noise type is different than outdoor
noise type.
• Lighting conditions inadequate to a daytime and to a
season. If the light intensity is not adequate to given
daytime and season, then probability of an indoor
location is increased.
• Shakes/movement speed. If the device is not moved for
a longer period of time, then probability of an indoor
location is increased.
False situation identity Assume that two following situa-
tion vectors are given:
s1 ¼ ½2; 2; 1; 3; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2; 1
s2 ¼ ½2; 2; 1; 3; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2; 3
Also a constraint rule is given that makes it impossible
for the user to authenticate with his face in the situation
when he walks in a hurry in a street:
c1 ¼ ½;; 1; 3;;;;;;
However, there might appear such a combination of the
other criteria values that cancels the constraint. Theoreti-
cally, it is possible that vectors s1, s2 do not reflect the
situation that is intended to be constrained by c1 (fast
walk). For example, a user may be on board the slowly
moving vehicle such as ferry—the speed measured by the
GPS is absolute, and the relative walking speed is lower. In
such case, the constraint rule c1 would exclude the
authentication method that is in fact applicable. The
learning systems is designed to solve such problems by
adding an additional criterion, or by extending the model
with additional criterion values.
3.4 Model evaluation
The core of the presented model, i.e., the decision process,
has been evaluated with proof-of-concept software proto-
type. The implemented VBA application applies rule-based
authentication and presentation constraints to situations
(contexts) represented by criteria value vectors and pro-
duces authentication and presentation decision. The eval-
uation has been performed in two phases. The goal of the
first phase was to confirm that for every possible context
unambiguous decisions are obtained. The goal of the sec-
ond phase was to verify whether obtained decisions are
consistent with the semantics of the constraints. For both
phases, authentication constraints explained in Table 5 and
presentation constraints explained in Table 6 have been
used.
In the first phase of the evaluation, the prototype
system has been run for every vector value combina-
tion. Formula (1) presented in the previous section
expresses the total number of theoretically possible
situations. As a result, unambiguous authentication and
presentation decisions have been obtained for every
possible context.
In the second phase of the evaluation, all the vector
values along with calculated decisions have constituted
input dataset for decision trees induction, that have been
intended for human interpretation of the decision process.
Total number of situation expressed by Formula (1)
Table 5 Authentication constraints used for the evaluation
Constraints vector Semantics Authentication method excluded
1. [1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0] Sound and vibration turned off, user is not moving Voice recognition
2. [1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1] Sound and vibration turned off, user walks, no peripherals Voice recognition
3. [0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0] Noise too high Voice recognition
4. [0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0] Noise type: conversation Voice recognition
5. [0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0] Noise type: music Voice recognition
6. [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0] Move sensor active Fingerprints
7. [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0] Temperature below 0 C Fingerprints
8. [0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2] User is not moving, speakerphone is connected Fingerprints
9. [0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 2] User is moving with vehicle, speakerphone is connected Fingerprints
10. [0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0] Lighting too low (too dark) Face recognition
11. [0 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 0] User walks fast (hurry) Face recognition
12. [0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3] User walks, headphones in use Face recognition
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includes also combinations for authentication and presen-
tation preferences. However, in order to make the decision
tree clear, the number of situations used for the trees
generation does not include user preferences and thus is




where k is criteria number, xk number of values for crite-
rion k.
Based on 9216 possible contexts (vector value combi-
nation), two trees have been induced: the first one that is
used for authentication method selection and the second
one for presentation method selection. Since the resulting
trees have more than 100 nodes, only a fragment of one of
the trees is illustrated in Fig. 3. Weka 3.6 application [8]
implementing C4.5 (j48) algorithm has been used (top-
down induction). The obtained decision trees, due to their
completeness and ‘‘positive’’ outcome representation (as
opposed to ‘‘negative’’ constraints), have allowed human
expert to verify consistency of the calculated decisions
with the intended semantics of the constraints.
4 Discussion
4.1 Delayed sensor data
If time interval between measurements is too high, there is
a risk that the system chooses the authentication method
based on inaccurate noise type and level, lighting level, or
temperature. The usual real-life reason for this type of the
measurement inaccuracy is the fact that right before
authentication the mobile device is carried in the pocket, or
briefcase, where the conditions are different from the
environment. Possible solutions include:
• Adding proximity sensor criterion and modifying the
constraint rules according to it.
• Adding environment conditions criteria, estimated
based on daytime, year season, and weather conditions
received from a Web service.
• Forcing the aquisition of the most current data from the
sensors in the moment of taking the device out
(checked with proximity sensor, Hall sensor, or both).
4.2 Two-factor authentication
Assuming m-banking application field of the proposed
model, two-factor authentication for sensitive transaction
protection is a necessity. Conforming to classical two-
factor requirement, authentication process is composed of
one of the ‘‘something user is’’ factors (face, fingerprints,
voice) plus one of the ‘‘something user knows’’ factors.
Examples of such combinations include confidential pass-
phrase spoken by the user and recognized after user voice
recognition or confidential sequence of fingerprints of
several fingers. In the less security-sensitive scenarios, the
authentication process can be composed of two factors of
Table 6 Constraints for user
interactions
Constraints vector Semantics Interaction method excluded
1. [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] Sound turned off Voice message
2. [0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] Vibrations turned off Vibration-based information
3. [0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0] Noise too high Voice message
4. [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] Speakerphone is connected Screen message
5. [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0] Move sensor active Vibration-based information
6. [0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0] Lighting too high Screen message
Fig. 3 Fragment of the decision tree generated from the model data
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the same category (e.g., ‘‘something user is’’—
face ? fingerprints).
In order to extend the proposed model to the two-factor
requirements, the following modifications have to be made:
1. Increasing the number of values for authentication
method criterion. To the set of values that correspond
to basic methods, pairs are added—two-element
combinations.
2. Adding a new criterion: Auth factors number. Allowed
values: 1 or 2.
3. Adding new constraints. The most important con-
straints to be added are ones that forbid one-factor
methods if Auth factors number equals 2.
In case when biometric authentication methods are
characterized by diversified FAR, FRR, or CER values,
additional Security sensitivity criterion can be added, as
well as constraints using it. Values of this criterion would
correspond to the current authentication accuracy require-
ment (required by the active mobile application), e.g.,
m-banking application would require higher accuracy (in
terms of FAR, FRR, or CER) than, for instance, device
unlocking.
4.3 Authentication choice as user authorization
for an application
Apart from the proposed context-based authentication
choice model, a complementary model could be developed
based on it. The idea is to use authentication choice as
means of user authorization for a given application. It is
based on the same approach as in the initial learning phase
of the proposed model—after the device is activated, all
biometrical sensors are activated at the same time (camera,
microphone, fingerprint scanner, and potentially other). A
user can authenticate himself or herself with a randomly
chosen method. Depending on the choice, after successful
authentication, the user is authorized to use resources of the
given mobile or Web application and is redirected to it
automatically. For instance, m-banking application can be
bond to the stronger fingerprint biometrics, while aug-
mented reality application—to the face recognition
biometrics.
5 Conclusions
The main contribution of this work is creating a generic
model for context-based biometric authentication for
mobile devices and, on this basis, designing a system to be
implemented on mobile devices in the actual stage of their
technological development. Contrary to earlier works,
context data are used in the process of active authentication
to dynamically select biometric authentication method
which results in two main features. The first one is the best
possible quality of the biometric samples acquired under
changing environmental conditions for various biometrics.
The second one is the conformance of the selected
authentication method with user’s intended interaction
scheme at the moment. What is more, not only the most
accurate authentication method, but also the proper
modality for informing the user about the choice and fur-
ther interactions with him or her is determined by the
system. The knowledge regarding context impact on
quality of biometric sample acquisition and on intended
usage scheme is stored in the adaptable knowledge base.
As it has been intended, the presented model is easy to
implement and in every possible context it is able to make
an unambiguous choice.
The model has been verified by prototyping—the proof-
of-concept software implementation has been developed.
The system is extensible: The criteria and possible values
can be seamlessly adjusted to major environments changes.
Discreet, vector-based representation of the context situa-
tions is human interpretable; thus, semantic subclasses of
the situation building the context can be easily distin-
guished (e.g., walking, street noise, freezing cold). There-
fore, predefining or auditing the initial constraints is
straightforward. As the system works, it could learn from
the feedback (recorded context situations and user manual
choices), and then the initial set of constraints could be
adjusted. Finally, the system evaluation, as it has been
intended, has allowed for identifying major conceptual
obstacles that have to be faced by the designers and
developers of such system.
Generally, the further development of biometric tech-
nologies and its applications in mobile devices will pro-
gress due to technological (faster authentication, better
resilience to attacks) and business (cost reduction, scale
effect, competitive advantage, users’ fad) reasons. How-
ever, a real synergy effect can be obtained through inte-
grating various biometric methods with each other and with
context data. Therefore, the main idea for future develop-
ment of the presented model and the system is to enable
them to exchange anonymized learning sets between dif-
ferent users to accelerate learning phase and to increase its
adaptability.
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